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Abstract A global growth in the middle class is anticipated to inﬂuence development choices and the
evolution of domestic polities associated with a ‘rising‘ South. Responding to the local effects of a multi-
polar world order will add to a citizen’s existing need to navigate national polycentrism. Exploration of this
citizen-centric phenomenon introduces a new, comprehensive analytic framework that combines public with
private governance, the latter categorised as modern, traditional and virtual. These categories are used to
compare and contrast events of mass activism in Brazil and Turkey. It is argued that electronically net-
worked agency played a signiﬁcant role in people’s navigation involving scale, mobilization and self-orga-
nisation. In addition, a polycentric analysis suggests that a stronger middle class ‘voice’ for public
accountability may be offset by processes that privatise domestic governance, reﬂecting what is happening
internationally.
Une croissance mondiale dans la classe moyenne est supposée inﬂuencer les choix de la coopération au
développement et l’évolution des systèmes politiques nationaux associés à un Sud « montant». Le besoin de
répondre aux effets locaux d’un ordre mondial multipolaire s’ajoutera à la nécessité actuelle pour un citoyen
d’évoluer dans un contexte de polycentrisme national. L’exploration de ce phénomène centré sur le citoyen
introduit un nouveau cadre analytique complet qui combine gouvernance publique et privée, cette dernière
étant classée comme moderne traditionnelle et virtuelle. Ces catégories sont utilisées pour comparer et
contraster les événements d’activisme de masse au Brésil et en Turquie. Il est soutenu que la possession d’un
vaste réseau électronique joue un rôle important dans la capacité des gens à évoluer dans ce contexte,
telle que la mise à l’échelle, la mobilisation et l’auto-organisation. En outre, une analyse polycentrique
suggère qu’une mobilisation plus forte de la classe moyenne en faveur d’une responsabilité publique peut
être annulée par des procédés qui privatisent la gouvernance nationale, reﬂétant ce qui se passe à l’échelle
internationale.
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Introduction
Evidence is mounting that the ‘Rise of the South’ is challenging decades of mono-centric
international governance, premised on the political, military and economic dominance of Euro-
America (UNDP, 2013). Less visible is that the worldwide scale of an emerging polycentric
power arrangement, with its potential outreach to ‘everywhere’, has long been paralleled within
nation-states. At this smaller, ‘globally nested’ scale, the aspirational forces stemming from
growth in the numbers of a middle class, recently abetted by mass connectivity, are enabling new
forms of collective action towards multiple sites of being governed. Prevailing domestic power
arrangements are being challenged, pushing authority to be redistributed, making a country’s
governance more polycentric, as in Kenya’s new devolutionary Constitution or, reactively, less
so as in Russia, both with uncertain long-term outcomes.
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This article adopts a discursive approach to explore what a citizen’s eye view of being
polycentrically governed domestically means, within the context of an expanding number and
geographies of ‘new’ middle-class actors. It does so by deploying an original, comprehensive
analytic framework to categorise polycentrism in the authority that citizens encounter day to day.
A civic agency perspective on their behaviour is provided by a political lens of civic-driven
change (CDC). This combination is comparatively applied to public disorder in Brazil and
Turkey as indicative examples of socio-political processes stemming from an expanding middle
class in ‘representing’ the effects of globalisation on internal economic differentiation, heighten-
ing demands for better governance.
A growing middle class is chosen because of its anticipated inﬂuence on development choices,
on the evolution of domestic polities, and on the nature of governance associated with emerging
polycentricism in the global order (UNDP, 2013, p. 14). Middle-class expansion is related to
signiﬁcant, rapid economic growth in emerging economies in the Global South, particularly in Asia.
These changes are attributed to democratic reforms in countries like South Korea, Thailand and
Taiwan, even though other parts of the same middle class have managed to keep hierarchies and
elitism in place: ‘the new rich’ in Asia, as Robinson and Goodman (1996, p. 3) have dubbed them,
‘appear as likely to embrace authoritarian rule, xenophobic nationalism, religious fundamentalism
and dirigisme as to support democracy, internationalism, secularism and free markets’ (for China,
see Chen and Lu, 2011). Where an increase of this class will lead, for example in terms of its values,
is far from certain. Nevertheless, whatever the future of middle-class values, it will be necessary to
navigate governance emanating from many locations in society.
To explore what this could mean, an innovative contribution of this article is to combine an
approach to socio-political analysis – CDC – with a novel framing of polycentric governance,
applied from the perspective of middle classes in two middle-income countries that are growing
and gaining from the economics of globalisation.
The following section argues in favour of systematically expanding the dominant state-centric
notion of governance as a public affair to include private sites of authority, and hybrids between
the two. The analytic approach to ‘navigation’ explained in the section ‘Navigating Governance
from a Citizen’s Perspective’ derives from work on CDC as a way to view citizens’ agency in
socio-political processes (Fowler and Biekart, 2013). The initial ‘citizenship’ framework is then
narrowed and explored from a problematised notion of a middle class, chosen for its anticipated
role in directing local and global processes as it (rapidly) expands in and beyond emerging
powers, especially China and India (Kharas and Rogerson, 2011). In the section ‘Emerging
Middle Classes – Characteristics and Prospects’, comparisons of activism in Brazil and Turkey
illustrate what viewing governance ‘from below’ can look like. Conclusions point towards an
expanding ‘repertoire of navigational aids’ that people self-initiate as ‘transforming activisms’, as
well as a potential contradiction between strengthening citizens’ voice and an erosion of
accountability for public affairs when governance is privatised and hybridized. It also recognises
the need to test and modify a more inclusive construct of polycentric governance as an addition to
the political analytic repertoire.
Polycentric Governance in the Networked Era – Towards a Citizen’s Eye View
The notion of polycentricism in governance is largely attributed to the publication in 1969 of a
seminal article by and the subsequent life work of Vincent Ostrom (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011).
The concept connotes multiple centres of decision making about and over the public domain,
associated with some form of authority to do so. Originally, polycentricism brought an explicit
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recognition of overlapping jurisdictions, with examples in the management of watersheds and
distribution of water resources downstream. It initially concentrated on governance as a task and
property of public administration under some form of democratic political mandate. When
provision of public services expanded to include the contracting of non-proﬁt organisations, the
perspective evolved towards a multi-organisational networked view. There was also an opening
out of this analytic framework towards reforms in systems of governing that were producing
supra-national bodies, while simultaneously applying the principal of subsidiarity to decision
rights and decision making at local levels. The European Union is a notable example of such a
process (Ostrom, 2005).
We argue that this, still essentially state-centric, evolution of polycentricism merits further
broadening by introducing a complementary perspective of citizens who are the subject of any
system of governing, democratic or otherwise. In other words, it can be useful to structurally
complement, but not replace, a public authority framing by adding a citizen’s eye view to the
notion of polycentric governance and its day-to-day navigation. Figure 1 introduces a framework
for doing so.
A Comprehensive Approach to Polycentric Governance
Public governing involves the authority to make decisions that inﬂuence people’s lives as
constituent members of a polity.1 This population can include citizens as well as non-citizens
of the country concerned, such as illegal immigrants, refugees or those who are stateless,
whose (non-voting) presence usually has political effects – such as xenophobia – generating
governance issues.
Exercising authority over public and private affairs is satisﬁed in two principle ways, typically
through formal and informal institutions. Formal governance usually relies on statutory
instruments of a nation-state, which bind citizens to non-discretionary rights and obligations.
Variations could recognise semi-autonomous geographies, such as the Basque region. Informal
governance arises from people’s acculturated or voluntary ascription of authority outside of
public bodies. Between and connecting the two are institutionally hybrid sites and forms of
applying authority.
This section begins exploration of a comprehensive approach to polycentric governance that
draws on existing perspectives, such as legal pluralism and non-state transnational rule-making,
seen in co-regulation between businesses and for-proﬁts. After a brief review of public authority,
it delves more deeply into possible private sources of authority and governance.
Figure 1: Polycentric governance: A citizen’s perspective
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Public authority and public institutions
Public governing is a necessity. In a Weberian sense, a pre-conditional backdrop to governance of
any type is one of a nation-state as ﬁrst among equals. Many factors determine the make-up of
public governance.2 A conditio sine qua non to be legitimate is the competent application of a
rule of law, but this ‘regulatory quality’ can vary signiﬁcantly. In principle, all people – as
citizens or not – within the legal jurisdiction of a nation-state are subject to its statutory rights and
obligations. The content of public authority applied to governance typically stems from historical
domestic processes and needs, as well as self-determined compliance with international
agreements, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and workplace standards set by
the International Labour Organisation.
Implementation of rules and policies, as well as ensuring adherence to decisions relying on
statutory governance, is provided by myriad public institutions and features of public adminis-
tration – civil servants, police, local and national tax collection and licensing authorities being
signiﬁcant – allied to nested, multiple levels of political-administrative hierarchy: wards,
constituencies, (sub) districts, provinces, regions, nations, states and so on (for example,
Bagayoko, 2010). But public governance is exercised in relation to the politics of time and place.
In much of daily life, politics and public administration conspire in less than obvious ways,
requiring insightful self-steering of a citizen’s agency to get something done about the conditions
they face. Such navigation is often through an intermediary lubricating the relational wheels,
often as a form of micro-corruption undermining accountability (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan,
2006). The general point is that a person’s agency towards public authority is seldom
straightforward, demonstrating signiﬁcant discrimination against women (Mies, 1999) as well
as on the basis of skin colour, ethnicity, caste, class, religion and sexual orientation.
The propensity for and tolerance of corruption as one much-observed quality variable
complicates a citizen’s agency towards sources of governing. Moreover, today’s urbanisation
means that – for most of the world’s population – interaction with public governance is mostly
through their dealings with municipal councils, their bureaucracies, and elected or appointed
ofﬁcials that run them. Where, for example, party afﬁliations of urban governance differ from
those of national government (as is the case of the Western Cape in South Africa), citizen’s
navigation can be subjected to contrary interpretations of rules driven by political games,
competition and one-upmanship.
Be that as it may, the complications of a citizen’s agency towards public authority are not the sole
source of being governed. The following section illustrates and discusses other locations of decision
authority in life that people must selectively and – voluntary or otherwise – contend with.
Private authority and voluntary institutions
While often less visible, of importance for governance day to day is people’s voluntary creation
of, claims on, and implicit or explicit self-ascription of authority to non-public entities. Three
major categories can be distinguished: those tied to processes of modernity; those allied to socio-
cultural traditions, faiths and identity relationships; and those linked to associating with the
interests of others, increasingly seen in followership activities that are ‘authorised’ by networked
virtual communities. We look at each in turn, starting with modernity, populated by for-proﬁt and
non-proﬁt entities.
Modernity A ﬁrst, often overt and far-reaching, sub-category and example of modernised
private governance emerges from ways in which businesses deal with the externalities
they create.
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Private governance is deﬁned as the ‘non-governmental institutions that govern – that is they enable and
constrain – a broad range of economic activities in the world economy’, and ‘serve functions that have
historically been the task of governments, most notably that of regulating the negative externalities of
economic activity’.(Mayer and Gerefﬁ, 2010: 1; in Knorringa, 2014)
Consumers and producers are subject to – and governed by – how market actors choose to
(mis)behave in terms of the ‘externalities’ they cause in society, both near and far. Be it for
reasons of long-term strategy, short-term competitive tactics, or reputational protection and social
legitimacy, for-proﬁts can choose and are choosing to alter their behaviour towards voluntary
norm compliance, which can reshape economic landscapes in pro-social ways. For example, to
avoid multiplication of effort, Knorringa (2014) reports that Nike, Starbucks and Walmart have
formed a platform to agree on social standards to be applied in their supply chains.
Movement towards for-proﬁt adoption of socially mediated values follows a Norm Life Cycle
model. Early movers, or ‘norm entrepreneurs’, take on a socially responsible innovation seen in
fair trade initiatives. When a critical mass of adopters is reached, norm adjustment cascades
through the system to eventually a ‘new normal’ stasis, which may gain legislative underpinning
(Knorringa, 2014, p. 370). In this type of adjustment to public space, in parallel to consumer
choice, citizen navigation implies that a polity must judge and guide how proﬁt-seeking private
agents are interpreting what it means to be socially responsible.
Within modernity, another sub-category of private governance is forms of voluntary
association that function autonomously from public bodies, yet exert themselves in the public
sphere. In analysing the evolution of private governance with transnational dimensions, Pattberg
(2005) identiﬁes and connects the micro and macro factors involved.
Microlevel conditions contain the problem structure and organizational resources because these are
dependent on the speciﬁc issue area and the actors involved. Macrolevel conditions relate to large-scale
transformations in the structure of the international system as well.(Pattberg, 2005, pp. 597–598)
In doing so, he examines schools of thinking that can be classed as varied responses to a
perceived decline of the nation-state, animating structural movement in the locations of authority
in a globalising economy. The nature of movement is inﬂuenced by the relative positions and
power of business and citizens’ associations, with a dualistic neo-Gramscian perspective of civil
society exercising counter-hegemonic demands for corporate accountability on the one hand
while, on the other, aiding and abetting hegemonic stabilization by elites required for efﬁcient
capitalist reproduction. Because their effects can be transmitted everywhere, the geographic
‘centre’ of private transnational governance is of minor consequence. Examples below illustrate
what – from a citizen’s perspective – this sub-category of private governance can look like.
To further the public good by private means – hence reducing demands on their budgets –
governments are prone to offer tax advantages to foundations, similar forms of philanthropy,
charities, faiths and non-proﬁt organisations more broadly. Recent ultra-modern examples are
mega philanthrocapitalist entities, exempliﬁed by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
(Edwards, 2008). They are often only one ‘blurry’ step removed from corporations because of a
non-distribution constraint, preventing allocation of resources to owners and governors (Bromley
and Meyer, 2014). With seldom a legal requirement for public involvement, by and large the
governance of such set-ups is a closed affair. Resembling self-selected oligarchies, boards
appoint board members in their own image. National jurisdictions determine minimum rules of
legitimate disbursement, transparency and accountability. For non-proﬁts, legally binding
international compliance is seldom applicable. At best, non-proﬁts can choose to conform to
voluntary codes of conduct accompanied by oversight mechanisms without statutory power,
which has to be exercised nationally. The situation for corporations is similar (for example,
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LEAD, 2012). The potential for citizen oversight on the private authority being exercised is not
very high. Even having some form of public process to appoint those who govern is no guarantee
of probity, as the following example illustrates.
In extreme instances, self-created non-proﬁt bodies take on an authority that compels
governments to act in certain ways, the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA)
being a, perhaps exceptional, example. FIFA is a non-proﬁt organisation established under Swiss
law governed by nominees from national and regional football associations that elect ofﬁce
bearers. Until recently, the organisation enjoyed tax advantages that abetted a lack of
transparency, enabling the type of corruption associated with patronage available to FIFA’s
long-standing president, Sepp Blatter (now classed as a ‘politically exposed person’3). FIFA
shuns any government interference in its (inter)national functioning, while dictating terms on
which a country can host the World Cup. At such events, FIFA takes the authority to determine
which commercial sponsors inhabit economic exclusion zones around stadiums; causes forced
evictions to construct stadia of dubious later economic merit; and requires impunity for
FIFA staff from tax and other laws where ‘its’ World Cup is staged. The game’s governance
lacks an ethical dimension, seen in the ‘summary justice’ treatment of Louis Suarez who bit an
opponent.
Another example of private governance is control over the internet. A recent ruling of the
European Court of Justice allows ‘the right to be forgotten’ by requiring information
accumulators like Google to not show links that are ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant
unless there is a preponderant public interest’ when requested (Economist, 4 October, p. 61).
Navigating the commercial power of private information in the public domain, and other privacy
issues associated with the internet, is likely to be an increasing citizen preoccupation. The general
point is that challenging or changing authority may mean confronting systems of poorly
accountable private governance, bordering on impunity.
Endogeneity and tradition A different source of private authority can stem from deep-rooted
cultural-ethnic social formations that people are born into, which function as age-old systems of
governing that are/need to be respected. This extant reality is capturing the attention of legal
pluralists who are debating the developmental implications of interplay between exogenous/
modernised and endogenous legal systems (for example, Tamanaha, 2011, p. 1).
Institutionalised and legalised forms of endogenous governance can be found in the
Constitutional recognition of (relatively) self-governing chieftaincies and kingdoms seen, for
example, in South Africa, Ghana and Uganda. However, such governance is typically
exercised through a less visible multitude of ‘non-registered’, self-organised, self-supported
organisational arrangements. These entities make up the dense fabric of associational life, with
self-determined decision rights and authority that members adhere to. They are not necessarily
benign. For example, local self-organised security arrangements provided by vigilantes such
as the Sungu Sungu in Kenya and Tanzania can employ extrajudicial punishments.3 They
function alongside mutually supportive community-based child care systems and voluntary
provisions of a place of safety for women escaping domestic violence. The general point is
that, from a citizens’ point of view, what you (can) choose to belong to typically comes with a
responsibility to accept – be governed by – decisions that are already made, otherwise the
associational set-up will not work, negating the value of belonging.
Most visible in the private ﬁeld of tradition are the many old and new faiths and sects, with
adherents and followers who ascribe authority to their leaders according to rules that would
seldom be classed as democratic. Appointments from within the religious elite and by them is a
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common practice, making a believer’s agency towards authority a risky affair requiring skill and
determination, seen, for example, in gaining redress for child abuse by Catholic clergy.
Virtuality A third category of private governance is ‘virtual’, stemming from people creating
‘authority’ by a voluntary self-ascribed followership, typically by joining social media sites
(Shirky, 2008). The collective ideas, ideals and motivational momentum that can emerge are
shown to have signiﬁcant effects across society. Net-enabled mass communication is altering the
relationship between leaders and followers in favour of the latter, through both quick elevation
and quick removal of mandate and associated authority. Physically embodied but politically
‘virtualised’ parties (for example, the Five Star movement in Italy and The Pirates Party in
Germany) are emerging as challengers to the prevailing and failing systems of European
democratic rule that may or may not be sustained by an active followership.
There is now a power of private organising without organisation that is consciously intended to
have an impact on the public arena and its decision-making processes. There is a technology-
based widening opportunity for ‘virtual’, ﬂuid, transient and ‘subterranean’ (Kaldor and Selchow,
2012) citizen navigation in public affairs. This engagement – occurring outside of formal systems
of political parties, elections and so on – is demonstrating an impact on statutory governance. In
doing so, this assertion is prompting regime responses of misinformation, censorship and
surveillance designed to curtail civic agency, limiting navigation to what those with power deem
to be ‘acceptable’ issues (Morozov, 2013).
In this sense, the Internet is but the latest in a history of communication technologies (print,
telephone, mobile phone) transforming the ways in which people can share knowledge and
collaborate; in turn, in new ways, this disrupts socio-political arrangements. The technology to do
so is best treated as a system-enabling actor to be understood in its own right, rather than just as a
neutral ‘tool’.
Blends and hybrids
Reference has already been made to hybrid or blended forms of authority between public and
private (for example, Billis, 2010). The ‘plural’ application of modern and traditional
jurisprudence has already been alluded to. Often, these two categories of governing can be
merged or blended by laws that ‘delegate’ public authority to self-governed entities, while
circumscribing the powers they enjoy – a form of semi-autonomy ‘… without democratic
accountability through a direct chain of political delegation’ (Maggetti, 2010, p. 1).
These set-ups provide an ‘arms length’ citizen relationship with a government’s implementa-
tion and oversight of public policies. Examples are politically autonomous ‘regulators’ of
potentially monopolistic service providers – energy, water, rail transport and telecommunica-
tions. The price that citizens pay, the rules for changing suppliers and so on are governed by such
semi-public, supposedly impartial, bodies. In addition, there are entities that regulate and protect
the interests of professions associated with medicine, architecture, law, education and so on.
Mass media are a complicated example (in terms of self-regulation) of how to ensure freedom of
information, avoidance of political capture and manipulation, yet where redress from mis-
reporting is notoriously difﬁcult to achieve. The scope for citizen inﬂuence and pathways to
ensure accountability are often opaque, tenuous and tedious. A general point is that a citizen’s life
is subjected to ‘hybrid’ authorities that are often semi- or non-transparent, and are not as resilient
against political manipulation as their status might imply.
From this expanded appreciation of governance, a challenge is to apply a citizen’s eye view of
agency and navigation of the powers involved. The next section describes a way of doing so.
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Navigating Governance from a Citizen’s Perspective
Analysis of citizen action directed at socio-political change has adopted a variety of frameworks
and perspectives. In development studies, a frequent frame of reference has been civil society
with its contending interpretations (for example, Glasius, 2010). However, concentrating on
agency expressed through visible associational life often obscures the underlying drivers of a
polity’s energy. Moreover, Western universalism has tended to treat civil society as either a non-
normative, enumerable category, or as if its functions are solely directed at pro-social objectives
(for example, Salamon and Sokolowski, 2004). Both are questionable assumptions: ‘uncivility’
was more or less ignored in favour of civility, a serious ﬂaw (Dekker and Evers, 2009). To
address these shortcomings, starting in 2007, a research programme on civic agency created a
systematic, citizens’ approach to the enquiry of socio-political processes in relation to power and
governance, known as Civic-Driven Change (CDC) (Fowler and Biekart, 2013).
CDC provides four lenses with focal points through which citizen navigation of polycentricity
can be viewed, together with a lens to observe power. After critically discussing what it means to
be middle class, we apply these civic agency lenses to comparisons of the – apparently similar –
trajectories of large-scale activism seen in Brazil and Turkey.
Citizen Navigation
Drawing on a set of working propositions, using four lenses, CDC is a way to interrogate
empirical cases of socio-political processes (Biekart and Fowler, 2012; Fowler and Biekart,
2013). These four are as follows.
The politics of belonging
CDC relies on a rights-based understanding of political agency: inclusive citizenship. This
usually ascribed (but sometimes acquired) identity is simultaneously individual and collective.
An amalgam of citizenship and other identities conﬁgures the socio-political terrain of power
relationships, which can be imagined in terms of peaks of power acquisition, schisms and
canyons between groups, and ﬂows of relational rivers that both connect and divide. As noted in
the introduction, a polity can contain non-citizens as well as citizens, itself a signiﬁer of (not)
belonging with political effects (Gaventa, 2006).
The politics of action
A CDC lens focuses on civic agency for good or ill throughout all realms of society. A CDC
perspective is therefore not institutionally ‘located’ – it is not ‘owned’ by civil society, as is often
assumed with citizens’ action. In whatever they do, people’s agency contains ‘political’ choices
that co-determine how a society thinks, feels, functions and evolves. What becomes ‘political’ on
the streets, in the media, in the economy and in systems of governance emerges from how power
has been gained, distributed and controlled. Consequently, a CDC lens does not focus on the
mechanics of politics, such as voting. Rather, it identiﬁes a domain of change where (enough)
people decide to alter the society they live in as a conscious act. People’s individual and collective
agency combines past experience, an imagined future and a real-time assessment of the effort and
risk involved in changing things locally or globally.
The politics of scale
The Tahrir Square rebellions and similar events across the world illustrate another core feature of
a CDC lens: scalability. A CDC analysis is applicable at local, regional, national and global level.
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This feature is valuable when change processes span multiple horizontal (networked) and vertical
(hierarchical) aggregations of civic agency, socio-political arrangements, and the different types
and sites of governance and authority. For example, the governance landscape shows growth in
voluntary self-regulation to make organisations more accountable without the heavy hand of
legislation. The women’s movement works locally and globally to end gender-based violence.
The UN Global Compact for Business and the impact of transnational citizen networks on multi-
lateral institutions involve micro to macro scaling of civic agency, most actively in responses to
environmental concerns. Transitioning from one scale to the next is often complex, introducing
unanticipated dynamics and outcomes as ‘emergent’ properties (Wheatley and Frieze, 2012). For
example, a Guy Fawkes mask became a multi-country signiﬁer of the emergence of a
transnational scale of solidarity consciousness across multiple sites of civic disobedience
comprising unrelated groups and alliances.4
The politics of knowledges and communication
A fourth CDC political lens is attention to the fact that civic agency is shaped by autonomy over
‘knowledge power’ in two signiﬁcant ways. One is to recognise that the multiple knowledges that
inform people’s agency have often been subjected to ‘epistemic violence’ by post-Enlightenment
colonial power (Icaza and Vázquez, 2013). Focusing on the ability of people to use their own
knowledge with open communication – a sensitive issue for autocratic regimes – is therefore a
crucial ingredient of applying a CDC view (Gumucio-Dagron, 2009).
The development of a CDC lens has required a corresponding systematic way of examining
power relations from the perspective of civic agency.
Practical power analysis Power can be appreciated in terms of types, with, for, over and within
(Gaventa, 2006), as well as their relative (in)visibility (Lukes, 2005). Combining these into a
matrix can disaggregate power as an interactive property that can be collectively generated and
applied (Fowler and Biekart, 2013). They include, for example, a ‘power from within’ that shows
up in reﬂexive elements, such as questioning compliance with externally imposed rules and
norms; choosing to gain and deploy capacities to act in the public sphere associated with
activisms; and self-selecting what ‘belonging’ means and its interpretations towards ‘the other’,
which can feed intolerance, uncivility and conﬂict.
In reﬂecting on the polycentricity of power in relation to systems of governance with no one
actor (able to be) in charge, Torﬁng et al (2012) argue for ‘interactive’ rather than hierarchical
arrangements. Their proposition reﬂects a type of multi-stakeholder initiative conﬁgured to
engage a plurality of actors, interests and types of authority interacting towards common
objectives. Those involved do so by bringing together resources and ideas that will reform the
‘rules of the game’ that governance systems apply. Interactivity is premised on non-linear,
process-based collaboration that connects, inter alia, to complexity in scaling. Interactive
governance invites interesting questions about the value and nature of gaining political mandates
from a polity, and being held accountable for the exercise of power in practice. Critically, the
discussion in the section ‘Polycentric Governance in the Networked Era – Towards a Citizen’s
Eye View’ suggests that the already weak potential that citizens have to navigate polycentric
governance in their favour may be further attenuated by complications inherent to interactivity of
multiple sites of authority. An example is inability to reconcile institutionally inconsistent
performance metrics and time scales.
An expanded view of governance and the application of CDC as an analytic tool provide the
framework to examine cases of civic agency. For reasons given in the introduction – their
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anticipated force in shaping the world’s development – we have chosen to do so from a
problematised notion and position of an expanding middle class in what are referred to as
emerging economies.
Emerging Middle Classes – Characteristics and Prospects
The UNDP Human Development Report (2013, p. 3) makes much of the fact that the middle class
in the South overall, and Asia in particular, will become a larger proportion of the world’s
purchasing and consuming population. Estimates posit an increase in the middle class from 30
per cent of the world population today to 52 per cent in 2020. In doing so, the report relies on a
Brookings Institute norm (Kharas and Rogerson, 2011) of a daily disposable income level of 10–
100 PPP$ per person (Purchasing Power Parity dollar as of 2005). This ﬁgure is arranged against
an international income poverty threshold of US$1.25 per person per day. Setting a global ﬁgure,
even corrected for PPP, has potentially seriously misleading drawbacks identiﬁed by Milanovic
and Yitzhaki (2001). They show that blocks of continents exhibit signiﬁcant differences and
reference points for what middle classness means and how it is experienced.
Correspondingly, there are context-speciﬁc variations of thresholds where, for example, the
‘ﬂoating middle class’ in Africa has incomes of $2–4 per person per day (Ncube et al, 2011) but
are prone to fall back below the international poverty threshold. This invites the idea that
vulnerability is a better measure (Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2011) of when a person is or is
not truly ‘embedded’ in the middle class. This view is also articulated by Birdsall et al (2013) in
their analysis of a ‘struggling’ middle class in Latin America. Alternatively, it is argued that a
more secure indicator of middle-class growth is when consumption turns to non-essential
products and services, with car ownership advanced as a suitable proxy (Dadush and Ali, 2012).
Putting deﬁnitional issues and measures aside, using household surveys involving
13 countries, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2008, p. 26) tease out how expenditures patterns alter between
different income categories, urban and rural. Their conclusion is that having a steady, well-paying
job is probably the most pertinent feature of middle classness, as is the fact they have fewer
children, while spending much more on them. Both feed a sense of control over the future.
In other words, there is a qualitatively signiﬁcant aspirational element in being middle class that
can drive the energy required to make inter-generational expectations real in terms of what
society should be and do, and with more resources, including free time, to do so.
Our exploration gives attention to what a growing middle class as a proportion of the whole
leads to in terms of societal effects. For example, studies of the behaviour and effects of an
expanding middle class in countries of Latin America show that increased income plus time
brings voice, allied to better access to information and sharper demands on what a state should do
(Loayza et al, 2012, p. 9). But voice for what? Already at issue is the global affordability and the
ability of a country and of nature to satisfy the lifestyles of the existing middle class. Fulﬁlling
expectations as a new middle class grows in numbers and stakes its claim is likely to be
problematic. Consequently, it is reasonable to anticipate that adjustment to their expansion will
be accompanied by (local) dissent, placing numerous sites of governance under stress. One
increasingly signiﬁcant source of tension is technology-enabled because middle classes are better
able to compare their situations – political systems, material assets, health, recreational options
and so on – with others near and far.
According to research by the Pew Foundation, a person’s ability to gain access to information
is being accelerated by the positive relationship between income per capita and use of
communications technology (Pew Foundation, 2014a). For example, other countries are
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outstripping the United States when it comes to using social media sites and texting (Pew
Foundation, 2014b). An interpretation is that there is an unprecedented middle-class ‘surge’.
Their political assertions in emerging middle-income countries are strong reminders that the
middle class drives history, but with less certainty about its direction. The spread of materially
aspirational majority populations (whose food and shelter are assured) across Asia, Latin
America and even Africa creates hopes and concerns shaping the future in ways that are hard to
predict and will not necessarily be rooted in Western values.5
The uncertain translation of the civic agency associated with the ‘movement of an expanding
middle’ into public space and its different sites of governing is already being played out in many
countries (Biekart and Fowler, 2013). As this middle class increases in absolute size, and in
proportion to the total polity and learns to assert itself, it is far from certain where their divisions
will be, what allegiances they form and where their civic energy will be applied. One option is
that they will model the elite, gaining as much as possible from the current economic system –
reinforcing business as usual. An alternative could be to reject the volatile, riskier and
questionably sustainable role models that the West has to offer, by searching for more
transformative pathways, such as Buen Vivir in Latin America or embracing a social solidarity
economy (UN-TFSSE, 2014). As a more culturally plural, polycentric world order takes hold,
other variants might try to recover and take forward historical social legacies that lie deep in
personal and collective identities of citizenship, nationality, race, gender, faith, ethnicity, old
rivalries and so on. An issue, therefore, is the direction taken by a ‘middle majority’ in terms of
the future it aspires to, where networked and ‘virtually’ governed forms of collective action are
coming to the fore. CDC described previously is used to explore what may be happening in two
countries.
Navigating Polycentrism from the Middle: Brazil and Turkey
Two examples elaborate and explore citizens’ encounters with polycentric governance under
conditions of large-scale civic unrest. The approach compares the – apparently similar –
trajectories of popular activism seen in Brazil and Turkey. Contrasting processes of civic agency
in these emerging economies located on different continents allows for relative examination of
socio-historical contexts within a polycentric framework.
Both socially disruptive processes started with agitation against a discrete issue of public
policy, which broadened in agenda, gained in the politics of scale, while changing class
composition as the politics of belonging and the power of being with others evolved in response
to repressive state action.
Civic protests in Brazil and Turkey emerged almost in the same period (May–June 2013), and
in similar ways, even though they had no direct relationship with each other. The Turkish protests
could be understood as a local response to the Arab Spring. But this would probably not do
justice to the diversity of the demands being voiced: reversal of Erdogan’s closure of political
space, an end to corruption and more respect for freedom of expression. The trigger was the
intended destruction of Gezi Park in Istanbul, escalating to major street protests led by middle-
class groups against the advent of an authoritarian democracy. Similarly, one can consider the
Brazilian protests as an eventual middle-class response to continuation of a left-wing government
after Lula had been succeeded by Dilma Rousseff of the same Workers Party (PT). The initial
trigger was mounting opposition to public spending, such as the infrastructure of the impending
World Cup football competition, leading to a much wider demonstration against government
performance and integrity. Later, FIFA’s lack of accountability to supporters fanned the ﬂames of
public dissent when ticket pricing and allocation was announced. In both cases, electronically
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networked agency played a signiﬁcant role in sourcing the real-time knowledge and providing the
communication required for mobilization, self-organisation and citizen’s self-governance in
terms of forming and following collective decision making with anticipated risks of physical
injury. We will examine both examples to illuminate active middle-class engagement with
polycentric governance at scale.
The wave of protests in Brazil started in June 2013, after a small group rallying against public
transport hikes in Sao Paulo was brutally beaten up by the riot police. This demonstration had
been organised by the (left-wing-oriented) Free Fare Movement, whose members gave it a
private authority to act and voluntarily followed its decisions by coming back the following
days, again being beaten up by the police in a naked display of ‘power over’. Journalists
initially reported rather negatively about the protest (against the price hike of bus fares by
nearly 8 per cent) as being out of proportion to the decision taken by the agency governing
public transport pricing. But when the mobilizations gradually attracted more and more
people, and journalists were beaten up as well, public opinion started to shift. Soon protests
became broader, also visible on television and social media, rapidly spreading to other cities in
Brazil. By early July 2013 a ‘power with’ afﬁnity of collective disaffection bridged differences
of social groups, helping scale to gain hold. Over a million people were daily taking to the
streets, initially lower-class workers, students and young urban unemployed, but later also
students with young professionals from the employed middle classes who voiced their
disagreement with price hikes for public services beyond transport alone. Agitation against
authority became multi-focused, with FIFA providing a private site of unaccountable authority
invoking public anger, attracting international attention and pressure to lower ticket prices.
Saad-Filho (2013) notes that, in a politics of belonging, the composition and focus of the
protests changed as soon as mainstream television stations and mass media started to take over
the lead, trying to de-radicalise the movement and drawing in different crowds. The protest
soon became more ‘white’ and middle-class based with demands related to the FIFA World
Cup, gay rights, legalization of drugs, abortion, and more in general a rejection of the PT
government of President Dilma Rousseff. In addition to private governance, four sites of
governance in public decision making were under threat: the city council; the transport agency;
public service agencies and the national assembly.
Ignition of the protests in Turkey was in a way similar. In Istanbul in late May 2013 a small
group of environmentalists staged a picket line objecting to the destruction of Gezi Park, situated
at the corner of centrally located Taksim Square, in order to construct a shopping mall. Police
used tear gas to disassociate the peaceful protestors, but they came back in larger numbers as the
message spread via social media, especially Twitter. This expansive reaction was also caused by
the decision by the conservative Erdogan government that state-controlled television stations
were to ignore the protests and instead broadcast other programmes, such as a documentary on
penguins, and cooking classes. This regime behaviour further fed a politics of belonging and
solidarity, propelling self-mobilisations, including broader demands ranging from freedom of
press (with people dressed as penguins), to redressing income equality, gay rights, women’s
reproductive rights, and the right to consume alcohol and the right to get together and to disagree
with the elected government. A politics of scale arose from diffusion of agitation throughout a
crowd of students, young professionals, football hooligans, and feminists, Kemalists, nationalists,
Kurds, LGBT activists, sex workers and anti-capitalist Muslims who took to the streets in one of
the largest manifestations of public dissatisfaction seen in recent years in Turkey (Özgüler, 2013,
p. 10). Popular protest towards multiple sites of governing included the city council, the state
media, the security services as well as the telecommunications regulator. Twitter can be singled
out as particularly important in enabling rapid scaling and inclusion of a wide diversity of citizen
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groups and their interests, manifest in ‘followership’, from private sources of governing, such as
the lawyers association, which were pre-existing and erupted in protest.
The more striking commonalities between the protests in Brazil and Turkey can be
summarised in three points. First is that civic energy started with activators who were soon faced
with police repression. The application of aggressive public governance stimulated an unfolding
into a diverse and substantial protest impetus – a non-movement movement – which was neither
dominated nor steered by any political party. This characteristic reﬂects the dynamics of latent
disaffections feeding a ‘contagious’ politics of belonging, emphasising the demand for voice.
Both the Turkish and Brazilian cases embody a hardly pre-meditated, communication-enabled
momentum accelerating the politics of action. They exhibit impulsive protests similar to the
expanding rebellions during the Arab Spring, which had no clearly deﬁned programme or
discourse other than resistance to current government behaviours and policies. The eventual core
of the protesters were predominantly young middle-class professionals and/or students, combined
with a variety of sector-speciﬁc dissenting groups, which led to a broad array of demands,
without any particular individual leadership being emphasised. In both countries it also
represented the largest and broadest popular revolt since the end of military rule in the 1980s.
A second common element was that this protest movement ‘from the middle’ demanded a
change of public policies that were pushing both old and new middle-income groups into a
struggle to retain their economic position. Here the politics of scale mattered. What started as
local capital city issues quickly broadened to acquire regional and national urgency. An
example is the resistance to paying more income tax in a setting in which corruption of (local)
government bureaucracies was ﬂourishing. Both the Lula and Erdogan governments were
tainted by corruption scandals that were not properly prosecuted. Such laxity fed a sense of
elite impunity, which has proven to be one of the key sources of civic activism, similar to the
wave of popular protest against nineteenth-century global capitalism analysed by Polanyi. The
economic rise of BRICS had increased the income of an impoverished layer of poor
generations, creating expectations for better living standards of the population as a whole,
including more accountable government.
That Erdogan managed to keep the ‘silent’ minority to support his AKP party is also because
of his control over the mass media, which condemned the left and neutralised the more extreme
right. His response can also be interpreted as a strategy to undermine the efﬁcacy of the private
authority of the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülem,6 as can his transfer of military and security
ofﬁcials to disempower the armed forces – perceived as Gülem’s followers and guardians of a
secular public authority.7 In Brazil, the PT governments of Lula and Rousseff were actually better
able to disarm the political right by strengthening the state and simultaneously preventing the
more radical left from taking advantage of the popular protests.
Even though differences between the effects of large-scale activism can be seen in Brazil and
Turkey, a third common element was the role of the media as actor, illustrating the combined
politics of action-oriented knowledge and its communication outside of state control. Erdogan
believed he could defuse the protests by ordering his TV stations to ignore them, for some reason
wrongly assessing the vast impact of social media. As soon as his party won the local elections in
March 2014, Erdogan announced a decision to block Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, as these
were undermining his position. Here we can see again how different sites of governance were
overlapping, as the media became an aid to citizen navigation of authority because it was not
controlled by Erdogan. The same goes for Brazil, where privately owned TV stations joined the
protest movement, contributing to its rapid expansion, but also to its depoliticisation as soon as
the government gave in and overruled the local public transport price hikes. Social media also
were used widely for people to contact each other, to convene somewhere without having a clear
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organisation and to march in a particular direction without a clear plan. This spontaneity probably
took political perspective out of the protest, which therefore also illustrates the potential
downsides of non-strategic, activist engagement with polycentric governing.
To summarise, mapping CDC across different sites of governing suggests that, albeit with
different speciﬁcities, in both cases the behaviour of public and private authority interplayed to
turn pre-existing disaffections into unruly middle- and multi-class agency. For Turkey, the
politics of Twitter communication and the politics of belonging to Fakir Gulem’s branch of Islam
weighed most heavily. For Brazil, the international politics of ‘belonging to football’ added to the
local medias’ shift in the politics of communication towards, rather than against, the protesters’
causes. A CDC appreciation of citizen interfacing with polycentric governance exposes similar
effects of secular and religious authority, with scaling attributed to media, both old and new.
Conclusions
This article has explored what a citizen’s eye view of being polycentrically governed
domestically means, within the context of a growing proportion of middle-class actors across
the world’s geographies. It argues in favour of broadening the state-centred framework for
governance analysis towards a citizen-centred standpoint. It does so from a ‘futures’ perspective,
informed by propositions in the literature that people’s improved material conditions will
enhance their ‘voice’, strengthening demands for accountable public governance – access to
information, no corruption, no vote rigging, adherence to the rule of law, bureaucratic and
corporate sensitivity to rights, and so on. In doing so, a polycentric framing with a political lens
provided by a CDC analysis illuminates a possible contradiction, namely, that growth in the
governance demands of middle-class voice and agency is occurring when authority over the
public realm is being hybridized and privatised in ways that, at ﬁrst glance, are eroding peoples’
potential to gain accountability of authorities for the rules and decisions that they experience in
daily life. This supposition merits further investigation.
The two cases illustrate that the effects of communication technology are likely to make past
eras and examples of middle-class growth a poor guide to how the socio-political forces they
contain will drive society forward, for whose beneﬁt, and with what values. For example, will
emerging middle classes exert mass agency through internet ‘clicktivism’ rather than on the
streets (Morozov, 2014)? Will signiﬁcant numbers want to pay more for ‘sustainably’ produced
commodities or a fairer income for poor, primary producers, or search the web for the cheapest
deal? The jury may be out, but whatever the answer it seems reasonable to assume that sentiments
towards being governed ‘fairly’ will remain as a source of civic energy and navigation towards
more complicated locations of authority.
Civic activism in Brazil and Turkey show the indeterminate socio-political dynamics that can
emerge from polycentric governance in terms of unanticipated alignments across expanding
middle-class groups, as well as with lower classes and the poor. This study encountered common
factors in the protests in Brazil and Turkey: a latency of issues where spontaneous protest about
one escalated to many; the lack of political party involvement; a middle-class realization that it –
rather than the state – would have to pay for the implementation of its demands; and the
autonomous role of (social) media.
These particular cases point to signiﬁcant interactions between the scaling of the politics of
belonging and the technology-enabled politics of knowledge and communication circumventing
state-mediated information. They show how assertions of civic power are directed at, but also
informed by, multiple types of governing and institutional locations of authority.
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Finally, connections between and layering of power associated with overlapping systems of
governing become transparent: ostensibly autonomous entities are simply politically overruled or
intimidated. Both cases suggest a middle class aspiring to what could be alluded to as ‘middle-
class values’, where polycentricity provides a non-normative framework for analysis without
taking this interpretation to be normal or inevitable.
Notes
1. For current purposes we treat governance as the exercise of decision-making authority over public
and private space and affairs. More loosely, following Lasswell, cited in McGinnis and Ostrom (2011,
p. 170), ‘governance determines who can do what to whom, and on whose authority’.
2. We treat institutions as socially stabilising but inherently conﬂicted and dynamic patterns of collective
human behaviour that are guided by emergent rules, norms, beliefs and conﬁgurations of power types in
actor relations.
3. http://www.refworld.org/docid/52a7305f4.html (accessed, 9 July 2014).
4. Economist, 4 November 2014. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-
explains-3
5. Op-ed, Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2013, by Alan Murray, President of the Pew Foundation.
6. http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition (accessed 20 August 2014).
7. http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=63453 (accessed 20 August).
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